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Abstract
In an interconnected world, cyber and physical networks face a number of chal-
lenges that need to be resolved. These challenges are mainly due to the nature and
complexity of interconnected systems and networks and their ability to support hetero-
geneous physical and cyber components simultaneously. The construction of complex
networks preserving security and dependability (S&D) properties is necessary to avoid
system vulnerabilities at design or runtime level. In particular, with the deployment
of Software Defined Networks (SDN), S&D weaknesses may occur in all the different
layers of SDN architectures. In order to design SDN network architectures with re-
spect to S&D, a model-based approach such as design patterns can be used adequately.
In this work, we define executional patterns for designing networks able to guarantee
S&D properties in legacy and SDN networks. To evaluate our defined pattern ap-
proach, we implement executable pattern instances, encoded in a rule-based reasoning
system, able to design and verify wireless SDN networks with respect to availability
and confidentiality. To complete this work, we propose and evaluate an implementa-
tion framework in which S&D patterns can be applied for the design and verification
of SDN networks.
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1. Introduction
The design of complex system networks is of paramount importance due to their
increasing implementation on cyber-physical networks. However, the design of such
systems encounters difficulties which need to be resolved as the nature of the sys-
tems are time-critical, distributed, intelligent and heterogeneous. The validation and5
the verification methods for developing secure and dependable system networks are
necessary and should be considered at design level to guarantee security and mitigate
safety threats, on remote monitored and managed networks. Especially, with the fast
growing of introducing revolutionary concepts like Software Defined Network (SDN),
integrated on 5G network architectures [1], the design of networks enters in a new era10
and makes necessary a careful investigation of the new security and dependability risks
which have not been relevant in legacy systems. One of the challenges of future net-
works is to develop SDN capabilities tailored to cyber-physical applications and drive
the reconfiguration of these capabilities through network configuration specifications
embedded through the cyber-physical infrastructures.15
SDN allow network programmability and control to be decoupled from the for-
warding plane and the forwarding plane to be directly programmable by the control
plane. Design patterns can be used to design networks or to validate SDN network
infrastructures and identify suitable paths and nodes with respect to S&D properties.
S&D patterns can be used to design SDN infrastructures determining also the type,20
the location and the connectivity of end nodes with forwarding devices. At the control
layer, design patterns can ensure secure connectivity between the controllers and the
programmable switches. In this paper, we give a detailed description of the pattern
definition form for the design of S&D legacy and SDN networks. The main contribu-
tion of the approach is that encodes designs of network topologies, which are proven to25
satisfy S&D properties, as design patterns. In addition, S&D patterns can be used for
the definition of optimal paths which are able to guarantee S&D properties in deployed
networks. A first definition of this pattern-based approach for designing reliable cyber-
physical networks was given in [2]. However in this work, we developed a pattern
framework in which we can evaluate and emulate S&D executable patterns on legacy30
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and SDN-based network designs. Finally, an application framework is proposed, in
which S&D patterns can insert and modify flow rules through the controller to the
programmable switches of SDN infrastructures.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3, we present the
schema of the pattern execution form. In Section 2 an overview of related work is35
presented. In Section 4, we introduce abstract specification instances of patterns with
respect to confidentiality and availability encoded also to a rule-based reasoning lan-
guage. In Section 5, we propose an implementation framework in which S&D network
patterns can be applied in order to design and verify SDN network architectures. In
Section 6, we emulate our proposed network patterns for the design of wireless legacy40
and SDN-based network architectures able to provide security against physical layer
attacks and failures at design or at runtime in hostile environments.Finally, Section 7
provides conclusions and future steps of our work.
2. Related Work
The main focus of existing work for the design of systems and networks focuses45
on specification analysis, design, verification, and validation of systems that include
hardware/software, data, procedures, and facilities. Driven from software development
methodology, Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) [3] can be used to analyze certain as-
pects of models, synthesize various types of artifacts and design secure and dependable
systems. The design of system is simplified through the modelling of design patterns.50
MDE applies design patterns [4, 5] as solutions for reusable designs and interactions of
objects by the use of formal proven properties[6]. An MDE framework for architecting
wireless networks is presented in [7]. Especially, the construction of network topolo-
gies includes the definition of network and traffic patterns. Authors in [8] address a set
of optimal patterns to achieve full coverage in wireless networks. Especially with the55
softwarization of networks in SDN, design patterns can be applied in all the different
layers of SDN architectures. Traffic engineering and patterns in SDN are presented in
[9]. Flow policy patterns as expressed by Frenetic languages, can generate flow rules
able to be installed in programmable switches of SDN networks [10]. In our approach,
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we can provide paths as flow rules based on the security requirements. Finally, design60
patterns can also be used in northbound interface using REST API as proposed in [11].
The development of S&D network patterns may benefit from the current imple-
mentations of software patterns as described in the literature in a variety of works [12],
[13], [14], [15], [16]. The concept of component-based architecture composition is
mainly applied on software components and service oriented architecture but it can be65
used successfully for designing networks [17, 18]. Safety and reliability patterns are
presented in [19]. The author describes a set of reliable patterns able to offer redun-
dancy on data transmissions for real-time and embedded systems. Workflow pattern
for QoS aggregation for web service composition have been proposed in [20]. In our
approach, executable workflow patterns are used for backward chaining for network70
compositions. Security workflow patterns, for service compositions based on enabling
reasoning engines such as Drools, are also described in [21, 22]. Drools enabling rea-
soning appeared to be also an efficient rule engine to represent our network workflow
patterns.
3. Network Pattern Schema75
SDN infrastructures are based on an architectural framework where the network
elements can be integrated through patterns with proven capability to enable the se-
mantic interoperability, and to preserve end-to-end and link-to-link security, privacy,
and dependability. Design patterns can be used be used as an instrument for designing,
verifying and altering the topology of SDN networks, at design time or runtime. At80
design time, the procedure includes the definition of a design problem and the required
S&D property that needs to be guaranteed by the SDN to be designed. In verifica-
tion, an existing SDN network design (topology) and the required S&D properties are
provided, and patterns are applied to analyse the former and establish if the latter are
satisfied. The analysis is based on checking if the topology of the pattern matches the85
network design or some part of it. Finally, at runtime patterns are applied to the design
of an operational network that is already known to satisfy given S&D properties. The
pattern specification schema is defined as follows:
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Definition 1. An S&D network patterns schema is an abstract structure of specifying
S&D network patterns which includes: (a) an abstract network topology, defining the90
control structure, data flows of the components of an SDN, (b) constraints that should
be satisfied by the components of the network that are composed according to the struc-
ture of (a), (c) the S&D property that the network topology in (a) guarantees, and (d)
an execution pattern rule.
3.1. Pattern Topology95
Patterns define generic ways of composing (i.e., establishing the connectivity be-
tween) and configuring the different and heterogeneous components that may exist at
all layers of the implementation stack of an SDN. The compositions defined by patterns
can be both vertical and horizontal, i.e., they can involve components at the same (hori-
zontal) or different layers (vertical) layer in the reference architecture of SDN. To do so,100
patterns should encode abstract and generic component interaction and orchestration
protocols, enhanced (if necessary) by transformations to ensure the semantic compat-
ibility of data or system functionality of the components that are (or need to be) com-
posed. Furthermore, the component interaction and orchestration protocols encoded
by the patterns must have an evidenced ability (i.e., an ability proven through formal105
verification or demonstrated through testing and/or operational evidence) to achieve a
semantically viable interoperability between their components. In SDN, components
can be either hosts, forwarding devices or controllers. Paths may include single step
links between two edge nodes or link compositions with at least one intermediate and
two edge nodes.110
In our patterns so far, we have focused on logical architecture of network repre-
senting end-to-end connectivity, security and dependability. The basic building blocks
for forming logical network topologies are the same as those identified for process
workflows in [23]. As it can be seen in Figure 1, the sequence topology depicts the
sequential composition of nodes in a network defines that a process is enabled after the115
completion of a previous one. This topology appears as the fundamental approach for
building network process blocks and the diameter/tiers of a network. The multi-choice-
join topology (OR-OR) provides the execution of a process to be diverged to two or
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Figure 1: Basic SDN pattern logical topologies: (a) sequence (b) parallel-split-join (c) multi-choice-join (d)
exclusive-choice-join
more branches. This topology offers redundancy in network structures. The parallel-
split-join topology (AND-AND) allows the parallel split into two or more branches.120
This topology is able to provide load-balance in network transmissions. Finally, the
exclusive-choice-join topology (XOR-XOR) diverges of a branch into two or more
exclusive branches. Exclusive disjunction can be used in networks in order to avoid
flooding and for conditional routing.
3.2. Pattern Constraints125
The SDN pattern schema includes also a set of constraints that should be satisfied
by the individual network components composed by the pattern and/or the component
composition as a whole. In order to complete the topology of the pattern specification,
the function constraints should be included. The constraints represent the functional re-
quirements in which a pattern should hold. The connectivity between two components130
is one of the most critical functional requirements especially for network. This can
be related to the type of components (hardware/software). Different parameters such
as distance or other constraints are crucial points for the definition of the placehold-
ers. For instance, in wired networks this connectivity can be satisfied using suitable
interfaces and cables. However, in wireless networks, the connectivity is based on the135
coverage of each node and it can be classified into deterministic and probabilistic mod-
els. Furthermore, running applications and services are crucial factors on the design of
networks. These applications are related to the available resources such as computa-
tional power, available memory, storage and networking capabilities. Other constraints
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which should be considered are quantity and type of nodes, interfaces per nodes, cost140
and energy consumption.
3.3. Pattern S&D Properties
S&D design patterns specify SDN designs that guarantee given security (confiden-
tiality, integrity, availability) and dependability (reliability, safety and maintainability)
properties. The satisfiability of an S&D property can be defined by a Boolean value145
(i.e. encryption enabled/disabled), an arithmetic measure (i.e. delay, encryption level)
or probability measure (i.e. reliability/uptime availability). It should be noted that
the composition of two components which preserve an S&D property does not neces-
sarily guarantee that the composition will also preserve the same property. However
in networks, it is important that properties are also guaranteed on the communication150
medium. Attacks on wireless medium can also cause an attack on a system component.
Since, the medium such as a wireless link cannot be modified, in order to guarantee a
security property of the system, the property should be satisfied at both the output of
the source node and at the input of the destination node.
Figure 2: Stepwise Decomposition
S&D patterns can be used to recursively build component compositions or decom-155
positions using forward or backward chaining respectively, as depicted in Figure 2. In
forward chaining, when C1, ..Cn are components that satisfy a property Pro then the
composition C formed of these components can satisfy Pro when the following form
can be proved:
When C1∧·· ·∧Cn satisfy Pro→C satisfies Pro160
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However, backward chaining appears to be more important in system design with
respect to a required property. When C is required to satisfy a property reqPro, then
suitable components C1...Cn should be found to satisfy reqPro:
reqPro(C)→ reqPro(C1)∧·· ·∧ reqPro(Cn)
Let a sequential composition of two components: C→C1∧C2. If a required prop-165
erty should be guaranteed by the composition, the subcomponents should satisfy the
condition reqPro(C)→ reqPro(C1)∧ reqPro(C2). If there are no atomic components
to guarantee the required property, a recursive procedure is used in which successive
(sub-) compositions are generated until the atomic components bound to them satisfy
the required properties. The decomposition can be analyzed as follows:170
reqPro(C1)→ reqPro(C11)∧ reqPro(C12)
reqPro(C2)→ reqPro(C21)∧ reqPro(C22)
 · · · → until nodes C11 ,C12 ,C21 ,C22that satisfy reqPro are found
3.4. Pattern Rules
Drools production system was chosen to express S&D patterns as rules because this
rule engine supports backward and forward chaining inference and verification by im-
plementing and extending the Rete algorithm [24]. Drools rules can encode the topol-
ogy of a pattern which main target is to find suitable component compositions in order175
to guarantee the required property. Drools production rules are stored in the produc-
tion memory and are used to process data inserted in the working memory (Knowledge
Base) as facts by pattern matching. Each rule consists of two parts: the when condi-
tion and the then actions. When the system does not satisfy the required property, the
pattern has to substitute, add or remove components. A Drools rule includes the inputs180
of the involved components, the type of composition and the required S&D property in
Left Hand Side (LHS). When the conditions of a rule in the LHS are satisfied, then the
rule is fired to execute the actions as described in the Right Hand Side (RHS). In the
RHS, the new requirements of the compositions or atomic components can be inserted,
updated or deleted in the knowledge base.185
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4. Network Pattern Specification Forms
In this section we present different abstract specification pattern instances able to
guarantee confidentiality and availability in network infrastructures based on the pre-
vious described pattern form.
4.1. Link-to-link Confidentiality Pattern190
Confidential transmission on the infrastructure layer focuses on keeping informa-
tion private ensuring that only the right people will have access to it[25]. In the follow-
ing, we define the link-to-link confidentiality pattern.
Pattern Topology: The topology of the link-to-link confidentiality network pattern
follows arrangements of nodes N1 and N2 as described by the sequence pattern. There is195
also a path P between N1 and N2: P = Path(source = N1,destination = N2). P may be
either an atomic link or path composition. The decomposition phase can be analyzed as
follows: P = Path(source = N1,destination = N2) = Path(source = N1,destination =
N3)∧Path(source = N3,destination = N2). The decomposition procedure is depicted
in Figure 3.200
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Figure 3: Sequence Decomposition
Pattern Constraints: The constraint of link-to-link confidentiality pattern includes the
connectivity between nodes. Especially for atomic links, the network connectivity is
related to the distance between edge nodes. When the maximum link range is r, the
distance between these nodes should be r ≥ Distance(N1,N2).
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Rule 1: Inference of Link-to-Link Confidentiality Pattern
1 r u l e ” I n f e r e n c e o f Link−to−l i n k C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y ”
2 when
3 $N1 : Node ( $ id1 : id , $p1 : p o s i t i o n , e n c r y p t i o n == t rue )
4 $N2 : Node ( $ id2 : id , $p2 : p o s i t i o n , e n c r y p t i o n == t rue )
5 $P : Pa th ( s o u r c e ==$N1 , d e s t i n a t i o n ==$N2 , $ r : range , $d : d i s t a n c e , $r<=$d )
6 $R : Requ i remen t ( p a t h == $P , p r o p e r t y . name==” E n c r y p t i o n ” ,
7 $ r e q P r o : p r o p e r t y . va lue , s a t i s f i e d == f a l s e )
8 then
9 Node $N3 = new Node ( $ id1 +$id2 , new P o s i t i o n ( $N1 , $N2 ) , t rue ) ;
10 i n s e r t ( $N3 ) ;
11 Pa th $P1 = new Pa th ( $N1 , $N3 ) ; i n s e r t ( $P1 ) ;
12 i n s e r t ( new Requ i remen t ( $P1 , new P r o p e r t y ( ” E n c r y p t i o n ” ) , $r , f a l s e ) ) ;
13 Pa th $P2 = new Pa th ( $N3 , $N2 ) ; i n s e r t ( $P2 ) ;
14 i n s e r t ( new Requ i remen t ( $P2 , new P r o p e r t y ( ” E n c r y p t i o n ” ) , $r , f a l s e ) ) ;
15 modify ( $R ){ s a t i s f i e d = t rue } ;
16 end
Pattern S&D Property: Link-to-link encryption protects traffic flows from monitoring205
since all data (payload and headers) are encrypted/decrypted in every hop. When two
nodes N1 and N2 are connected following the sequence pattern, the path is confidential
when both nodes are able to share encrypted data: Path(N1,N2,encryption = true)→
Node(N1,encryption = true)∧Node(N2,encryption = true)
Rule 2: Verification of Link-to-Link Confidentiality Pattern
1 r u l e ” V e r i f i c a t i o n o f Link−to−Link C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y ”
2 when
3 $P : Pa th ( $N1 : sou rce , $N2 : d e s t i n a t i o n , $Pro : p r o p e r t y )
4 $R : Requ i remen t ( p a t h . s o u r c e ==$N1 , p a t h . d e s t i n a t i o n == $N3 ,
5 p r o p e r t y . name==” E n c r y p t i o n ” , $ r e q P r o : p r o p e r t y . va lue ,
6 $ r e q P r o ==$Pro , s a t i s f i e d == f a l s e )
7 then
8 modify ( $R ){ s a t i s f i e d = t rue } ;
9 end
Pattern Inference Rule: The confidential rule encodes the sequence workflow pattern210
topology. In the LHS of this pattern, the rule matches two nodes (lines 3-4) and a path
$P with source the $N1 and destination the $N2(line 5). The constraint of the pattern
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topology defines that the link range $r should be less or equal to the distance between
$N1 and $N2. The S&D property $reqPro that the pattern should guarantee is presented
in lines 6-7. When the topology constraint and the S&D property are not satisfied the215
rule will enter in the RHS of the rule. In the RHS, a new node $N3 should be inserted
between the $N1 and $N2 (lines 9-10). Moreover, two new paths $P1 and $P2 and two
new requirements $R1 and $R2 for these paths will be inserted in the knowledge base
(line 11-14). Finally, the rule will modify the requirement of the satisfaction to true.
The recursive procedure will complete when the minimum number of nodes satisfy the220
distance constraint and therefore the S&D requirement.
Pattern Verification Rule: The second confidentiality rule, includes the verification
procedure in case of an existing SDN network design. The paths in which confiden-
tiality property is satisfied can be given by the use of the depth-first algorithm. The
required S&D confidentiality can be validated by the implication of Rule 2.225
4.2. Redundant Availability Pattern
Network availability is the ability of a system to be operational and accessible when
required for use [25]. Availability patterns can be used for the discovery of composi-
tion of network elements with verified availability properties. The description of the
redundant availability pattern is following:230
Pattern Topology: The topology of the redundant pattern follows both the sequence
and the multi-choice-join pattern. The topology consists of four nodes, the source
N1, the destination N2 and two nodes N3 and N4 placed in the middle of end nodes.
The pattern also includes four paths: P1 = Path(source = N1,destination = N3), P2 =
Path(source = N3,destination = N2), P3 = Path(source = N1,destination = N4), P4 =235
Path(source = N4,destination = N2). The decomposition phase can be analyzed as
follows: P = Path(source = N1,destination = N2) = (Path(source = N1,destination =
N3)∧Path(source = N3,destination = N2))∨ (Path(source = N1,destination = N4)∧
Path(source = N4,destination = N2)). The decomposition procedure (Figure 4) can
continue until atomic links are found.240
Pattern Constraints: The constraint of redundant availability pattern includes the con-
nectivity between nodes. Especially for atomic nodes and paths, the network connec-
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Figure 4: Redundant Pattern Decomposition
tivity is related to the distance between nodes. When the maximum link range is r, the
distance d between these nodes should be r ≥ d.
Pattern S&D Property: The availability of this pattern is related to the sequence and245
multi-choice node composition. Therefore, the availability of the redundant pattern
Pro is equal to: Pro = 1− (1−ProP1 ·ProP2)(1−ProP3 ·ProP4). When the required
availability property of the entire path is reqPro, the network availability should sat-
isfy the following condition: reqPro ≤ Pro. More precisely, in case of equal atomic
uptime probability (ProP1 = ProP2 = ProP3 = ProP4 ), the required availability of each250
path should satisfy the following equation: Pro≥
√
1−√1− reqPro. It can easily be
proven that the recursive application of the pattern will increase network availability
when the atomic link probability is Pro ∈ (0.62,1)
Pattern Inference Rule: The pattern rule encodes the described redundant topology.
In the LHS of this pattern, the rule matches two nodes $N1 and $N2 (lines 3-4). The255
pattern also matches a path $P with source the $N1 and destination the $N2(lines 5-
6). The constraint of the pattern topology defines that the link range $r between the
nodes should be less or equal to the distance between $N1 and $N2. The S&D property
$reqPro that the pattern should guarantee is presented in lines 7-8. When the topol-
ogy constraint and the S&D property are not satisfied the rule will enter in the RHS of260
the rule. In the RHS, two nodes $N3 and $N4 should be inserted in parallel between
the $N1 and $N2 (lines 10-11). Moreover, four new paths and requirements will be
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Rule 3: Inference Rule of Redundant Availability Pattern
1 r u l e ” I n f e r e n c e o f Redundant A v a i l a b i l i t y ”
2 when
3 $N1 : Node ( $ id1 : id , $p1 : p o s i t i o n )
4 $N2 : Node ( $ id2 : id , $p2 : p o s i t i o n )
5 $P : Pa th ( $N1== sou rce , $N2== d e s t i n a t i o n , $ r : range , $d : d i s t a n c e , $r<=$d ,
6 Pro . name==” A v a i l a b i l i t y ” , $Pro : Pro . v a l u e )
7 $R : Requ i remen t ( p a t h ==$P , p r o p e r t y . name==” A v a i l a b i l i t y ” ,
8 $ r e q P r o : p r o p e r t y . va lue , $Pro<$reqPro , s a t i s f i e d == f a l s e )
9 then
10 Node $N3 = new Node ( $ id1 +$id2 , new P o s i t i o n ( $N1 , $N2 ) ) ; i n s e r t ( $N3 ) ;
11 Node $N4 = new Node ( $ id1 +$id2 , new P o s i t i o n ( $N1 , $N2 ) ) ; i n s e r t ( $N4 ) ;
12 Pa th $P1 = new Pa th ( $N1 , $N3 , $r , $Pro ) ; i n s e r t ( $P1 ) ;
13 i n s e r t ( new Requ i remen t ( $P1 , new P r o p e r t y ( ” A v a i l a b i l i t y ” ,
14 Math . s q r t (1−Math . s q r t (1− $ r e q P r o ) ) ) , f a l s e ) ) ;
15 Pa th $P2 = new Pa th ( $N3 , $N2 , $r , $Pro ) ; i n s e r t ( $P3 ) ;
16 i n s e r t ( new Requ i remen t ( $P2 , new P r o p e r t y ( ” A v a i l a b i l i t y ” ,
17 Math . s q r t (1−Math . s q r t (1− $ r e q P r o ) ) ) , f a l s e ) ) ;
18 Pa th $P3 = new Pa th ( $N1 , $N4 , $r , $Pro ) ; i n s e r t ( $P2 ) ;
19 i n s e r t ( new Requ i remen t ( $P2 , new P r o p e r t y ( ” A v a i l a b i l i t y ” ,
20 Math . s q r t (1−Math . s q r t (1− $ r e q P r o ) ) ) , f a l s e ) ) ;
21 Pa th $P4 = new Pa th ( $N4 , $N2 , $r , $Pro ) ; i n s e r t ( $P4 ) ;
22 i n s e r t ( new Requ i remen t ( $P4 , new P r o p e r t y ( ” A v a i l a b i l i t y ” ,
23 Math . s q r t (1−Math . s q r t (1− $ r e q P r o ) ) ) , f a l s e ) ) ;
24 modify ( $R ){ s a t i s f i e d = t rue } ;
25 end
inserted in the knowledge base (line 12-23). Finally, the rule will modify the require-
ment satisfaction to true. The recursive procedure will be completed when the distance
constraint and required availability property are satisfied.265
Rule 4: Verification Rule of Redundant Availability Pattern
1 r u l e ” V e r i f i c a t i o n o f Redundant A v a i l a b i l i t y ”
2 when
3 $P : Pa th ( $N1 : sou rce , $N2 : d e s t i n a t i o n , $Pro : p r o p e r t y . v a l u e )
4 $R : Requ i remen t ( $P== path , p r o p e r t y . name==” A v a i l a b i l i t y ” ,
5 $ r e q P r o : p r o p e r t y . va lue , $Pro>= $reqPro , s a t i s f i e d == f a l s e )
6 then
7 modify ( $R ){ s a t i s f i e d = t rue } ;
8 end
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Pattern Verification Rule: The verification availability rule, includes the validation
of an existing network topology with respect to availability. The required availability
property can be validated by the implication of Rule 4.
5. Implementation and Tool Support
Design patterns can be used for the design of SDN infrastructure layer or for the270
verification of existing SDN infrastructures. To give a proof of concept of our approach,
we evaluate the applicability of the S&D pattern for the design and verification of SDN
networks. The proposed framework is presented in Figure 5. In the next subsections,
the analysis of each implementation phase of the pattern network will be presented.
5.1. Design Patterns and Tools275
The rules defining S&D patterns were deployed in Eclipse Modelling Tool (4.5)
with the JBoss Drools 6.3.0 extension. The class diagram of the created Java classes
which are used by the Drools rules are depicted in Figure 6. Each Link includes a source
and a destination node. In addition, a Path can include a Link or a set of interconnected
links.280
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Figure 5: Proposed SDN Pattern Based Infrastructure
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Node
 - id: String
 - position: Coordinates
 - address: IPaddress
 - encryption: Boolean
 - encryptionKeys: List<Key>
 - range: double
Link
 - pathLoss: Probability
 + getSource()
 + getDestination()
 + getDistance()
 + getRange()
Path
 + getLinks()
 + getNodes()
 + getProperties()
Requirement
 - satisﬁed: Boolean
 - path: Path
 - property: Property
 + getPath()
 + setProperty()
 + setSatisﬁed()
Property
 - name: String
 - value: Value
Figure 6: Class Diagram of Classes Available for the S&D Production Rules
5.2. Design SDN using a Pattern Framework
To design SDN infrastructures, we propose a pattern framework tool as shown in
the activity diagram of Figure 7. A network designer can insert in our tool S&D pat-
terns as Drools rules and descriptions of network and S&D network requirements and
constraints as facts in the working memory of the pattern framework. The tool then285
uses Drools to apply the S&D pattern expressing rules and identify if a network can
be formed out of the available types of nodes that satisfies the required S&D property.
The topology generated by the patterns is exported into a custom format acceptable by
the Mininet1, an emulator which is able to create realistic virtual SDN networks. The
created custom configuration file may contain nodes (i.e., hosts and switches) and links290
of the network. Especially with the use of simulators such as Mininet-WiFi [26] and
NS32, it is possible to include not only switches and hosts, but also OpenFlow-enabled
access points. .
5.3. Verify SDN using a Pattern Framework
The verification of an existing SDN network with regards to S&D, can be validated295
using our proposed pattern framework as depicted in Figure 8. In this framework, a de-
signer is able to insert S&D patterns in the pattern rules production memory. Node and
1http://mininet.org/
2http://www.nsnam.org/
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Figure 7: Activity Diagram of Pattern Framework for SDN Design
links together with the S&D requirement can be inserted in the working memory as
facts. Suitable Java classes have been developed able to obtain (GET) nodes and links
from the inventory list of the OpenDaylight controller3. After the execution of S&D300
patterns, new paths can be inserted (PUT) or current paths can be deleted (DELETE) or
modified (POST). These paths can be expressed as flow rules in a XML format trans-
ferred to the controller using the RESTful interface. By the use of verification patterns,
suitable paths can be found in order to pre-plan and reserve paths with respect to S&D
properties. Finally, the proposed framework can be used not only for the verification305
of network paths but also at runtime i.e. on link failure or when a S&D property is not
guaranteed.
Pattern Framework
Pattern
Rules
Pattern 
Matching
Insert/ 
Update/ 
Retract Facts
Insert S&D 
Patterns
Working 
Memory 
(Facts)
REST/XML
GET Network 
Topology 
(Nodes/Links)
DELETE Flows Programmable Switches
Controller
Topology 
Manager
Flow 
Manager
PUT Flows
Figure 8: Activity Diagram of Pattern Framework for SDN Verification and Adaptation
3https://www.opendaylight.org
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6. Evaluation and Experiments
The implementation described in Section 5 has been used for an evaluation of our
approach in two different SDN design scenarios. These scenarios and the outcomes of310
the evaluation are presented in the following subsections.
6.1. Scenario 1 - Design of SDN Networks
The first scenario involves the transmission between two host nodes (source and
destination) using wireless-enabled network nodes. Apart from the source and the des-
tination, all the other nodes act as relays, that send the received data continuously. To315
design a S&D network able to avoid attacks on the communication medium such as
eavesdropping and DoS, the described in Section 4 confidentiality and availability pat-
terns are applied. The inputs to the pattern based network design tool for both S&D
patterns are: (a) the distances between source and destination node of the network
are 500m, 1.000m, 2.000m, 5.000m, 7.000m and 10.000m, (b) the maximum range of320
communication link is 100m. The outputs that the tool generates are: (i) the network
nodes, (ii) their position (i.e., the tier in which the nodes should be placed) and (iii) the
number of links.
Link-to-Link Confidentiality Pattern: It implicates that the exchanged data on the com-
munication channel should be encrypted. Therefore, each node should be able to en-325
crypt/decrypt data by applying link-to-link encryption.
Redundant Availability Pattern: It implicates that the path availability is related to the
probability of an attack. In our experiments we considered 99% the uptime proba-
bility and the required network availability is 99.999% (or less than one-minute daily
network downtime) network.330
After the execution of S&D patterns, the outcomes of the tool are presented in
Table 1. As it can be seen in the table, apart from the number of nodes of each pattern,
it can also provide the needed time to execute each pattern. The number of nodes
produced by the confidentiality pattern, represents also the minimum number of nodes
for a functional network. However, the purpose of this pattern is to enable link-to-link335
encryption. On the other hand, the requirement of 99.999% availability suggests that a
great number of nodes should be installed, especially for long distance links.
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Table 1: Results of Conducted Experiments
Distance Confidentiality Pattern Availability Pattern
(metres) Nodes Exec.Time (msec) Nodes Exec. Time (msec)
500 4 44 12 56
1.000 8 58 44 81
2.000 16 60 170 192
5.000 32 85 684 1487
10.000 64 101 2734 7530
The developed S&D network topologies can be transformed to SDN network by
the use of Mininet emulator. The created SDN infrastructure can include hosts and
OpenFlow-enabled (wired or wireless) switches as obtained by S&D patterns. Then,340
the emulator is able to forward the topology to a remote controller such as OpenDay-
light. Figure 9 depicts the outputs (nodes and links) of the redundant pattern when the
distance between the source and the destination is 500m, the range is 100m and the
uptime probability is 99%.
Figure 9: OpenDaylight SDN Infrastructure Topology
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6.2. Scenario 2 - Verification and Runtime Adaptation of SDN Networks345
The second scenario includes the verification of an existing SDN infrastructure
(such as the network topology shown in Figure 9) by the use the proposed pattern
framework of Section 5.3.The initial network topology (nodes and links) can be ob-
tained from the topology manager of OpenDaylight controller. However, in this sce-
nario, network nodes and links have different channel availability and encryption level350
as presented in Table 2.
Table 2: S&D Properties of Network Topology
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Encrypted X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Availability (%) 99 99 97 99 98 99 99 98 99 97 98 99 98 99 97 99
S&D verification patterns can be executed proactively to define paths and con-
vert them to OpenFlow rules with high priority. To proceed with the evaluation of
our apporach, the following requirements were inserted in the working memory: R1=
Requirement(path.source == $n1, path.desti-nation == $n2, property.name == Avail-
ability, property.value == 0.95, satisfied == false) and R2 = Requirement(path.source
== $n1, path.destination == $n2), property,name == Encryption”, property.value ==
true, satisfied == false). After the execution of confidentiality and availability verifica-
tion patterns, as defined by Drools rules, a number of possible solutions were produced.
The paths that guarantee both properties are presented in the following expression in
which the ∧ represents the sequence composition and ∨ represent the parallel compo-
sition:
SR1 ∧SR2 = l4∧ l8∧ ((l11∧ (l15)∨ (l12∧ l16))
S&D verification patterns can also be executed at runtime adaptation such as a DoS
attack. In case the a network fall, new alternative network paths must be found. A
depth-first algorithm will have to re-evaluate the topology of the system. However,
the most important factors for runtime adaptation appear to be both the detection to355
identify an attack or failure and the reaction time to transfer the new flow rules to the
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controller and the switches. Finally, this mechanism of S&D patterns can also be used
as an intrusion detection mechanism in order to react in case of malicious adversaries
that create DoS attacks.
7. Conclusion and Future Work360
In this paper, we proposed a pattern framework in which S&D pattern can be used
for the design and verification of network. More specifically, the development of legacy
and SDN networks on critical infrastructures has introduced new challenges includ-
ing security and dependability. Consequently, network modelling is crucial for design
network with respect to S&D properties. Our work included a methodology on how365
to preserve a S&D property through patterns, encoded as rule-based reasoning. Our
pattern-based approach aimed to minimize the effects of passive and active attacks on
physical layer. To prove the applicability of our executable patterns, we developed an
implementation able to design and validate SDN network infrastructures. Our future
plans contain the completion of the pattern form, developing also pattern instances suit-370
able to guarantee properties not only at the infrastructure layer, but also at the control
and application layer. Finally, our future work will include the development of a com-
plete framework to cover not only horizontally layered designs but also vertical layers
of SDN architectures.
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